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One of the profoundest ironies of the modern age is that the natural science revolution—the source of so much that is good, admirable, useful, and authoritative—has helped 
inspire illusion amid the social sciences. What naturalism misses 
is the deep disjuncture between human beings, who are creative, 
rational, self- interpreting agents, and the other objects that com-
pose the universe. The renewed call to humanism voiced by Tay-
lor and MacIntyre requires carefully distinguishing human beings 
from other sorts of objects. For science, no less than religion or 
ideology, can be distorted and turned into a form of superstition. 
In this regard, the interpretive tradition is a precious resource for 
resistance against the increasing naturalism that dominates our 
technocratic age. For every day this distorting power advances, 
stripping humanity of its dignity and replacing it with the levers 
and gears of a deadened machine. These words not only conclude 
Jason Blakely’s insightful commentary on the development of 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor’s thinking but also sum-
marize his argumentative purpose in this short and economical 
work. 
Naturalism in the social sciences has long been for me “the 
emperor with no clothes,” so from the outset I must admit com-
plete sympathy with and enthusiasm for Blakely’s purposes. Con-
sequently, I would not be his best interlocutor for improving his 
arguments. His commentary, however, has encouraged me to re-
read MacIntyre, whose work I have not picked up since a graduate 
course in political philosophy at the University of British Colum-
bia in the early 1990s. Further, Blakely’s commentary has impelled 
me to read Charles Taylor for the first time, even though he is 
somewhat of a household name in Canada. 
Blakely’s book is required reading for anyone involved or in-
terested in social or political research and policymaking. Indeed, 
Blakely’s arguments—in expounding the thought of Taylor and 
MacIntyre—provide an antidote to much of the chaos and rather 
flimsy (though generally unarticulated) philosophical anthropolo-
gies currently evident in much policymaking and technocratic 
forms of management prevalent in 2016.
As a trained social scientist, I have spent the last two decades 
following a detour into theology as a consequence of pursuing a 
vocation as a Roman Catholic priest and member of a religious 
order. Therefore, I found Blakely’s book an excellent review of 
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For example, the standard secularization thesis cannot account 
for why religion widely still exists in an advanced industrialized 
society such as the United States. The noted social scientist Steve 
Bruce attempts to explain this lingering effect in the United States 
citing the need for social cohesion among immigrant groups. (102) 
Thus, according to Bruce, religion serves an “integrating func-
tion.” However, in challenging that approach, Taylor “believes 
that functionalist explanations like Bruce’s in fact rest on a banal-
ity (i.e., a system of beliefs like religion helps create social cohe-
sion) but are incapable of explaining why particular people adopt 
the beliefs that they do, religious or otherwise.” (103) In contrast, 
Taylor offers an alternate explanation, and the reader can decide 
which offers a better account of the range, depth, and nuance of 
human experience. I will not repeat Blakely’s account of Taylor’s 
argument here, for the point is not to decide between the ap-
proaches but rather to demonstrate Blakely’s point that there is an 
objective way of determining the best approach without appealing 
to the criteria employed by the natural sciences. (104)
I now turn briefly to MacIntyre’s contribution which has fur-
ther convinced me that my previously uncritical acceptance of nat-
uralism within the pantheon of social scientific methodologies is 
no longer appropriate. MacIntyre describes “a dual moral culture 
that dominates late- capitalist societies: on the one side are rival 
claims to foundational, quasi- scientific moral objective certainty 
and on the other are subjectivist philosophies that reduce all mo-
rality to emotive preferences.” (105–6) For MacIntyre, this moral 
chaos is rooted in Enlightenment naturalism. It was believed that 
by rejecting religion and traditional understandings, morality—
following the model of the natural sciences—could be based on 
reason alone. Enlightenment naturalism, however, generated not 
state of the discipline from the time Taylor and MacIntyre started 
thinking about the human person as a social animal in the 1950s to 
the present. I now find I have a way to exit the theological detour 
and merge once again with the path of social and political thought. 
My previous suspicions about “naturalism” in social scientific 
thought and methods stemmed from two sources. First, I have 
always been numerically challenged, so I could never really cot-
ton to the dominance of the language of the behavioral approach 
in social and political study. Second, in the research and writing 
of my doctoral dissertation (1995), I was strongly influenced by 
ordinary language philosophy in addition to the thought of R. G. 
Collingwood and thus drew a strong distinction between the idea 
of history and the idea of natural science. In addition to not hav-
ing the confidence at the time to assert that there was really no 
place for natural scientific methods in the study of human agency 
and society, I saw no adverse effect in adopting a “live and let 
live” stance toward a pluralism in social- scientific methodologies 
that admit naturalism in its pantheon of approaches—indeed as its 
dominant approach within this pantheon. 
Two decades later, on the other hand, having since embraced 
a thick theological anthropology, I can now see clearly the human 
damage done by “naturalism” in its position as the dominant 
method of the social sciences. Taylor and MacIntyre still admit 
theoretical pluralism, but, according to Blakely, they offer a means 
of objectively measuring between theoretical approaches. Rather 
than determining which approach most nearly pretends to mimic 
natural science, we need only answer one simple question: “Which 
theoretical approach, by comparing it to others, better explains 
the range, depth and nuance of human socio- political experience?” 
(96–97)
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a single but several “rival naturalist standards for resolving moral 
disagreement.  .  .  . Various competing strains of utilitarianism, 
natural rights theory, deontology, rival Marxisms, and so on all 
laid claim to universal rational status.” (106–7)
Both Taylor and MacIntyre not only level a devastating cri-
tique of naturalism but also offer an alternative approach: a narra-
tive of interpretive philosophical history. Contingent causes, and 
not unvarying laws of nature, are what best explain human agency. 
